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REMEDIES FOR DISPROPORTIONATE TAX
ASSESSMENT IN KENTUCKY
By GEORGE MUEHLEN-KA3NP*
The purpose of this note is, as the title suggests, to consider
the remedies available to a taxpayer to correct a dispropor-
tionate tax assessment. Although confined to a consideration
of the problem as it exists in Kentucky, it is believed the
solution suggested is generally applicable. The note must
necessarily be limited in scope and will, in the main, be confined
to ad valorem taxes imposed by a taxing uit larger than a
municilpality This rather arbitrary exclusion of all city taxes,
as well as those other than ad valorem, is necessitated by space
restrictions and the fact that the problem of city taxes varies
to a great extent, depending in part on the size and class of
the city
In an attempt to bring the problem into sharp focus, it
appears helpful to divide the discussion into four phases (1)
The tax structure generally, as related to assessment and
correction, (2) Correction of individual assessments, (3) Stat-
utorv correction of assessments as a whole, so as to equalize
the burden of counties, (4) Suggested method of securing
relief.
THE TAX STRUCTURE GENERALLY
In general, the process of assessment is undertaken by one
of three agencies, the County Tax Commissioner, the County
Board of Supervisors, or the Kentucky Tax Commission. Each
of these will be considered separately, as well as the process of
assessment, an understanding of which is essential in considering
the remedial process.
a. County Tax Commisswner
In most instances the actual assessment is made either by
the county tax commissioner or, more rarely, by the board of
supervisors. The office of county tax commissioner apparently
* LL.B., University of Kentucky Address: 834 N. Fort Thomas
Ave., Ft. Thomas, Ky
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owes its existence to the restrictive nature of the Kentucky
Constitution. That instrument provides for a cou nty assessor,
who is ineligible to succeed himself, although this does not
apply apparently to city assessors of cities of the first and
second class who, by section 160 of the Constitution, are
not "fiscal officers" ineligible to succeed themselves. Under
authority of section 104 of the Constitution the office of county
assessor has been abolished and the duties given to a county
tax commissioner,' who is eligible for re-election.
Although the office created is described as coity tax
commissioner, it was held in Talbott v Bvrke that such officials
are "state officers" serving both the Commonwealth and their
respective counties. Another indication of the importance of
tlis office is the provision in thje statute that "The assessment
made for state purposes shall be the basis for the levv of
the ad valorem tax for county purposes.*" In addition, any
city may adopt the assessment of the county tax conmissioner.
The county tax commissioner is authorized, " subject
to the direction, instruction and supervision of the Department
of Revenue, [to] make the assessment of all property in his
county except as otherwise provided for. " with the assess-
ment to be at "fair cash value."'
b. County Board of Supcrvsors
The county board of supervisors, appointed by the county
judge, consists of three members appointed from the county at
large, unless the fiscal court orders that it be composed of one
'KY. CONST. sec. 99.
Ky. CONST. sec. 104.
..The General Assembly may abolish the office of Assessor and
provide that the assessment of property shall be made by other of-
ficers; but it shall have power to re-establish the office of. As-
sessor and prescribe his duties. No person shall be eligible to the
office of Assessor two consecutive terms."
Ky. R. S. (1946) sec. 132.370.
287 Ky 187, 190, 152 S.W 2d 586, 587 (1941)
'KY. R. S. (1946) sec. 132.280. The Fiscal Court has no au-
thority to make or provide for assessments. Jefferson County v.
Young, 120'Ky 456, 86 S.W 985 (1905) See also Ky. R. S. (1946)
sec. 67.080.
Ky. R. S. (1946) sec. 132.285.
'Ky. R..S. (1946) sec. 132.420 (1).
'KY. CONST. see. 172; Ky. R. S. (1946) secs. 132.190 (3), 132.450
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member from each magisterial district in the county '° Normally
they meet on the first Monday in February, but it is provided
that no meeting shall be held until the "tax roll has been
completed and the assessments of the county tax commissioner
have become final in accordance with law." "
c. Kentucky Tax Corn rnssion
The Kentucky Tax Commission is an agency of the Depart-
ment of Revenue, consisting of the Commissioner of Revenue
and two Asqociate Commissioners.': Among other powers and
duties, the Commission makes certain assessments, such as those
involving public utilities, public service corporations, franchises,
etc. '" Since the incidence of aessment by this commission as
well as appeal from its findings is relatively low, scant consid-
eration of the remedial process need be given here. Suffice it
to say that, if the commission acts within its scope, the taxpayer's
remedy is exclusively statutory" The statutory remedy provides
that a taxpayer may petition the Department of Revenue for
a review by the Commi's and, if the decision on review be
adverse, the taxpayer may then appeal to the Franklin circuit
court.'" Although the statute states that the remedy there pro-
vided is exclusive, the court recognizes that an injunctive
proceeding will be appropriate in a proper case, such as one
involving a void asse sment." Thus, in City of Louisville v
Martin ' the court held that a mere error in judgment as to fair
cash value would not authorize the court to interfere, but also
pointed out that a mandatory injunction would lie in certain
situations, as where the Commission did not act in good faith.
In addition to this rather limited range of assessment, the
Department of Revenue is charged with supervision and control
over the work of county tax commisioners in the assessment
'"Ky. R. S. (1946) sec. 133.020.
1 Ky. R. S. (1946) sec. 133.030.
'-Ky. R. S. (1946) sec. 131.020 (2).
"Ky. R. S. (1946) secs. 131.030, 131.090.
"Ky. R. S. (1946) sec. 131.125; Reeves v. Fries, 292 Ky 450,
166 S.W 2d 985 (1942).
'"Ky. R. S. (1946) sec. 131.110 (b).
'"Ky. R. S. (1946) sec. 131.120.
"7Reeves v Service Lines, Inc., 291 Ky 410, 164 S.W 2d 593
(1942).
" 284 Ky 490, 144 S.W 2d 1034 (1940).
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process.'" The influence of the Commission is also felt at a lower
level since they have the duty of equalizing the assessments by
county or taxing district,' and the power to order a reassessment
in an assessment district." This phase of the Commission's
operation will be considered at more length below
d. The Process of Assessment
The process of assessment properly begins "as of July 1,"
the date of assessment. ' Between that date and September 1,
the owner must list the property or have it listed with the
county tax commissioner of the county where the property is
located.' Where property is in the hands of a guardian -2 ' or a
personal representative,' he should list it. The owner's listing
is, however, not the assessment, but only evidence from which
the assessment may be made.'
If the property owner fails to list his property the county
tax commissioner lists it ' (although provision is made in certain
instances for the taxpayer to list omitted properky with the
county court clerk)' and, in such case, he need not give notice
to the taxpayer. But the taxpayer must still go to the board of
supervisors before seeking the assistance of the court ' since he
is charged with notice that the tax commissioner will make the
assessment, and thus may acquaint himself with the assessment,
inasmuch as the books are open for inspection between January
15 and February 1. If the taxpayer fails ta list part of his
property the commissioner may list and assess the omitted part,
but he must then give notice of the assessment.' If, however, he
"Ky. R. S. (1946) sec. 132.420.
"Ky. R. S. (1946) sec. 133.150 et seq.
2' Ky. R. S. (1946) sec. 132.660.
Ky. R. S. (1946) sec. 132.220 (1)
"Ibid.
"1Webber v Comm., 265 Ky 696, 97 S.W 2d 422 (1936)
-Comm. v. Camden, 142 Ky 365, 134 S.W -914 (1911).
'Ky River Coal Corp. v. Knott County Board of Sup'rs., 245 Ky.
822, 54 S.W 2d 377 (1932)
-Ky. R. S. (1946) sec. 132.220 (2).
"Ky. R. S. (1946) sec. 132.310.
Breathitt County Board of Sup'rs. v. Ware Cannel Coal Co.,
297 Ky 117, 179 S.W 2d 225 (1944).
"Ky. R. S. (1946) sec. 133.045.
"Ball v P V & K. Coal Co., 235 Ky. 445, 31 S.W 2d 707 (1930),
Boske v Louis Marx & Bros., 161 Ky 460, 170 S.W 1175 (1914).
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refuscs to list his property, the assessment is made by the board
of supervisors or the county court.' It should be noted that
this applies only when the taxpayer ref tses to list the property,
and not when lie merely fails to do so, for in the latter situation
the commissioner acts.'
The assessment by the tax commissioner is required to be
"' at its fair cash value, estimated at the price it would bring
at a fair -voluntary sale. " as determined " from his
knowledge, from information in property schedules and from
such other evidence as he may be able to obtain."' In addition
to making original assessments, the commissioner may increase
an assessment but, here also, notice to the taxpayer is required."'
Finally, if all others have failed to list the property for tax
purposes, the statute" provides that the Department of Revenue
shall cause a listing of all property omitted bv county tax
comnissioners, boards of supervisors, Kentuckv Tax Commission.
or any other assessing authority
After completing the tentative assessment of all property
before December 1, the commissioner files a recapitulation with
the Department of Revenue."' The Department makes an exam-
ination, and may correct the assessments from data obtained
from any source"° or, on complaint of owners of not less than
10% of the taxable property in'the assessment district or for
any other just reason, may order a reassessment." The corrected
tentative valuation is completed by January 15, and between
then and February 1. the rollls are open for inspection in the
county tax commissiomner's office, unless the time is extended
" KY. R. S. (1946) sec. 132.570.
•'KY. R. S. (1946) sec. 132.580; Clark v. Belknap, 11 Ky L.
Rep. 791, 13 S.W 212 (1890)
'Lowther v. Moore, 191 Ky 284, 229 S.W 705 (1921)
' KY. CONST. sec. 172; Ky. R. S. (1946) secs. 132.190 (3) 132.450
(1) Actually, assessors generally have disregarded this strict re-
quirement and treated it as only requiring uniformity at propor-
tionate values. Prestonsburg Water Co. v. Prestonsburg Board of
Sup'rs., 279 Ky 551, 131 S.W 2d 451 (1939)
"Ky. R. S. (1946) sec. 132.450 (1)
37Ky. R. S. (1946) sec. 132.450 (2) Ball v. P V & K. Coal Co.,
235 Ky 445, 31 S.W 2d 707 (1930) Negley v Henderson Bridge Co.,
107 Ky. 414, 54 S.W 171 (1899).
1 Ky. R. S. (1946) sec. 132.330 et seq.
"KY. R. S. (1946) sec. 133.040.
,0 Ibid.
41Ky. R. S. (1946) sec. 132.660.
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by the Department of Revenue. *' After the inspection period,
the tax rolls are delivered to the county court clerk, who makes
a second recapitulation of this final assessment.' Finally, when
the board of supervisors meets, the commissioner s books are
delivered to them by the county court clerk."
CORRECTIOX OF INDIVIDUAL ASSESSMENTS
After the assessment is made the taxpayer who is seeking
relief must begin by filing a letter with the county court clerk
between the following January 15, the date on which the tax
rolls are opened for inspection, and the date the board of super
visors meets, the first Monday in February, stating the reasons
for his appeal.' On a hearing of the matter the taxpayer has
the burden of proof and must show cause for correction." In
addition, the board of supervisors may, on its own initiative.
increase an assessment, assess unlisted property, or correct
erroneous assessments,"- but the board must notify the property
owner and provide a date for a hearing.s After the board has
conducted a hearing a taxpayer's statutory method of securing
relief follows one of two courses. Within 30 days after adjourn-
ment of the board, either he or the taxing agency may appeal
to the circuit court of the county where the property is located "
or to the Kentucky Tax Commission,' either of whom conducts
a hearing de novo and fixes the value?' If the appeal is to the
circuit court the taxpayer may next appeal to the Court of
Appeals, while if the appeal is to the Kentucky Tax Commission
he may appeal to the Franklin Circuit Court and thence to
the Court of Appeals.
If the complaint of the taxpayer is based solely on an
"-Ky. R. S. (1946) see. 133.045.
"Ky. R. S. (1946) sec. 133.046.
"Ky. R. S. (1946) sec. 133.030 (1)
" ,Ky. R. S. (1946) see. 133.120 (1).
'OHyden v. Breathitt County Board of Sup'rs., 244 Ky. 505, 51
S.W 2d 441 (1932)
'-Ky. R. S. (1946) sec. 133.120 (2)
41 Ibid.
"Ky. R. S. (1946) sec. 133.120 (4).
Ibid.
Ibid.
"As provided by Ky. R. S. (1946) see. 131.120.
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excessive valuation, the statutory remedy is exclusive, and a
failure to pursue that remedy will bar his action.'
In addition to the statutory process other remedies will,
under certain circumstances, be allowed. It has already been
pointed out that where the Tax Commission makes a void
assessment injunctive proceedings will lie.' So, too, an injunction
will be granted in the case of an illegal tax levied by any other
assessing agency City of Lancaster v Pope ' although dealing
with a city tax, cites many cases to support the unequivocal
statement that " the illegality of a tax is regarded as a
sufficient reason for enjoining its collection at the suit of a
single plaintiff, whether the tax be upon personalty or
realty Y ' Za
The requirement of notice is strict, and it has been held
that a taxpayer, even though he may know of the notice, need
not appear if the board fails to notify him in strict compliance
with the statute, but if he does appear he waives the strict
requirement.57 Thus, notice given by posting it on the property
of the taxpayer is effective only as to that particular tract and
such other as is contiguous, and is wholly ineffective as to tracts
owned by the same taxpayer wich are not contiguous.' It
would appear from this that notice may be valid as to one and
void as to another tract simultaneously Also, where the statute
allows service of notice, in case the taxpayer is out of the county,
to be delivered to some person over 16 years of age at the
residence of such person, or bv posting a copy of the notice on the
front door of the residence, Burnside Supply Co. v Burnside
Graded Comnmon Sclool' held that service on the wife of the
taxpayer in the latter's store, while he was absent but in the
county, was void. Of course this would be true also where the
'-Royer Wheel Co. v. Taylor County 104 Ky. 741, 47 S.W 876
(1898).
" Reeves v Service Lines, Inc., 291 Ky 410, 164 S.W 2d 593
(1942).
156 Ky 1, 160 S.W 509 (1913)
City of Lancaster v Pope, 155 Ky 1, 4, 160 S.W 509, 511
(1913).
• Ward v. Wentz, 130 Ky 705, 113 S.W 892 (1908).
r'Lowther v. Moore, 191 Ky. 284, 229 S.W 705 (1921).
'260 Ky. 482, 86 S.W 2d 160 (1935).
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assessor. rather than the board, increased the assessment without
-notice, and an injunction would lie'
It should be noted that irregularities as distinguished from
illegalities in actions by the assessing body will not entitle a
taxpayer to an injunction, because there the statutory remedy
is exclusive."1 An example of illlegality is the assessment of
,onstitutionallv exempt property,' or assessment of unlisted
property by the board without notice.' Where the board makes
-a higher valuation than the property is actually worth, but the
proceedings are regular, there can be no injunctive relief.' It
is on- when the valuation by the assessing body is so excessive
as to amount to spoliation that collection may be enjoined, since
the tax is then illegal." A very sound reason exists for this
.seeminlv arbitrary rule. as pointed out by the Court of
Appeals "'If taxpayers, upon a mere opinion of excessive
y-aluation. can prevent by injunction, the collection of the
revenues due to the State or county, confusion and inconvenience
-vould speedily result therefrom." '  Assuming that the tax-
paver is actually entitled to equitable remedies, the Court of
Appeals will not refuse to hear him because the amount of the
-tax involved is less than $200.00.'
It would appear, then, that the individual taxpayer is
-fairly well protected against discrimination if the question is
one of correction of an assessment in order to equalize his
property with other property in the same county or taxing
district. If lie is alert to his rights, and if the corrective officials
-perform their duty, the statutory remedy adequately safeguards
10Boske v Louis Marx & Bros., 161 Ky 460, 170 S.W 1175 (1914).
"Mossett v. Newport & C. Bridge Co., 106 Ky 518, 50 S.W 63
(1899)
'Ky & W Va. Power Co. v Holliday 216 Ky. 78, 287 S.W 212
.(1926) Ryan v. City of Louisville, 133 Ky 714, 118 S.W 992 (1909)
"Durbin v. Ohio Valley Tie Co., 151 Ky. 74, 151 S.W 12 (1912).
" Sanford v Roberts, 193 Ky 377, 236 S.W 571 (1922) Johnson
v. Bradley-Watkins Tie Co., 120 Ky. 136, 85 S.W 726 (1905)
'Ky Heating Co. v. City of Louisville, 174 Ky. 142, 192 S.W 4
.(1917)
"Royer Wheel Co. v. Taylor County 104 Ky. 741, 744, 47 S.W
876 (1898).
'Buckner v Clay - Ky - ,. 206 S.W 2d 827 (1947) Breath-
itt County Board of Sup'rs. v. Ware Cannel Coal Co., 297 Ky. 117, 179
S.W 2d 225 (1944) Burnside Supply Co. v. Burnside Graded Com-
mon School, 260 Ky 482, 86 S.W 2d 160 (1935)
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his interests. If the taxing officials act beyond their authority
the taxpayer still has a remedy by equitable proceedings.
Equ~mA.Tiox A-ONG COUNTIES
A more difficult problem presents itself in a situation where
the county as a whole is assessed higher than another -county in
the state, although the individual's property is not over-assessed
as compared with other property in the same county so, that
there exists ail inequality between the assessments ii different
parts of the state. We have already seen how the state assess-
ment is also the county as.%essmient and may be the city assess-
ment. If, then, the assessment in "A" county is higher in
proportion to actual cash value than is the assessment in "B"
county, it is obvious that the taxpayers in "A'" county are
bearing a heavier burden of the tax load than their neighbors
in "B" county It is proposed to examine the requirements as
to state-wide uniformity of assessment, the actuality of such
uniformity, and the method, if any, available for correction.
Three sections of the Kentucky Constitution are important
in this connection, and their applicable provisions are as follows
Section 171. ." Taxes shall be levied and col-
lected for public purposes only and shall be uniform
upon all property of the same class subject to taxation
within the territorial limits of the authority levying the
tax; and all taxes shall be levied and collected by gen-
eral laws "
Section 172. "All property not exempted from
taxation by this Constitution, shall be assessed for tax-
ation at its fair cash value, estimated at the price it
would bring at a fair voluntary sale; and any officer, or
other person authorized to assess values for taxation,
who shall commit any willful error in the oerrormance
of his duty shall be deemed guilty of misfeasance, and
upon conviction thereof shall forfeit his office, and be
otherwise punished as may be provided by law."
Section 174. "All property whether owned by
natural persons or corporations, shall be taxed in pro-
portion to its value, unless exempted by this Constitu-
tion; "
While it is true that these sections do not require, in terms,
that the ratio of assessments to value must be uniform through-
out the state, it is thought that such was the ntent of the
" Supra, n. 6.
KEXTUCKY LAV JOURNAL
framers of the Constitution, and that this interpretation is
supported by the court. The report submitted to the Constitu-
tional Convention by the Committee on Revenue and Taxation
shows that section three of that report corresponds with the
present section 171 of the Kentucky Constitution, while section
four of the same report is almost identical with section 172 of
the Constitution as adopted.' The chairman of that committee,
in explaining their recommendations, said "You all know that
Assessors in different localities fix different standards of value,
thereby imposing on different communities, different rates of
taxation. ,, "' The framers of the Constitution appear to have
had no difficulty in realizing that equality of burden is impos-
sible without equality of assessment, and attempted to insure
such uniformity
The courts also seem to understand that uniformity of
taxation means uniformity of burden and not simply uniformity
of rate In Eimenece Distillery Co. v. Henry County Board of
Sl'p 1 .71, the court quotes the above sections of the Constitution
and points out
"These sections not only require that, the rate
of taxation upon all property shall be uniform, but itjust as emphatically demands and requires that the bur-
den of taxation upon all property shall be equal In
order that taxes levied shall be lawful and have the
sanction of the Constitution, it is essential that, the bur-
den which it imposes shall have the necessary virtue of
equality, as that it shall be uniform.'"'
Does this "uniformity" refer only to uniformity of rate,
or does it also require practical uniformity of assesment 9 The
court seems to have thought the latter, when it made the state-
ment that "Whenever the tax assessing authorities have
systematically disregarded the imperious demands of the Con-
stitution and Statutes, that all property shall be assessed at its
fair cash value, by adopting a general level of proportionate
values, everybody must have been treated alike." ' An even
more emphatic assertion appears in Lang v Common-wealth.74
2 DEBATES, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (1890) p. 2372.
: 2 DEBATES, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (1890) p. 2384.
178 Ky. 811, 200 S.W 347 (1918).
'Id. at 818, 200 S.W at 350.
'McCracken Fiscal Court v. McFadden, 275 Ky 819, 825, 122
S.W 2d. 761, 764 (1938).
7' 190 Ky 29, 226 S.W 379 (1920)
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"That the burdens of taxaticn must be uniform, ana
to be uniform must have the essential of equality, and
must bear alike upon all property within the limits of
the unit wherein it is lawful to levy taxes for a purpose,
there can be no doubt, whether that unit be the state,
county or a inunicipality"- (italics added)
If uniformity means uniformity of burden within the taxing
unit, if the taxing unit, for some taxes at least, be -the state,
if the state and county assessment is the same, and if assessments
in various counties vary greatly, it is obvious that the resulting
burden of taxation is not uniform. The writeris of the opinion
that there is a clear duty imposed on the assessing officials, no
matter what their sphere of activity to secure practical uni-
forinity of assessment. The Constitution, by section 172, requires
assessment " at its fair cash value. " and, while the courts
recognize that absolute equality cannot be attained " and that
assessors may disregard the strict requirement of "fair cash
value," treating it as requiring uniformity at a general level of
proportionate values in assessing various classes of property,'
the constitutional and legislative intent is still clear.
It is this very condonation of uniformity-at a proportionate
level, rather than uniformity at "fair cash value" as the Con-
stitution requires, or uniformity at a uniform proportionate
level, wlch produces the discrimination. If the assessors of "A"
county, for example, are conscientious and endeavor to secure
a fair assessment, their efforts may produce a uniform assess-
ment at, say, 90% of fair cash value. Meanwhile the assessors
of "B" county, with an eve fixed on the forthcoming election,
have assessed their voters uniformly at 25% of fair cash value.
The inevitable result is that the taxpayers of "A" county are
shouldering part of the riahtful burden of the citizens of "B"
couuty One would be naive, indeed, to believe that such con-
.ditions do not exist. As early as 1888 Judge Bennett stated
- Id. at 34-35, 226 S.W at 382.
; "A contention that absolute equality could be attained or that
such is necessary would be the mere musing of a dreamer." Eminence
Distillery Co. v. Henry County Board of Sup'rs., 178 Ky. 811, 819,
200 S.W 347, 350 (1918) accord, Swift Coal & Timber Co. v. Board
of Sup'rs. of Letcher County 223 Ky. 461, 3 S.W 2d 1067 (1928).
- Prestonsburg Water Co. v. Prestonsburg Board of Sup'rs., 279
Ky 551, 131 S.W 2d 451 (1939) where an assessment was reduced
by the court to the prevailing level of 60% of fair cash value, despite
-the claim that the property was assessed at less than full value.
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it is a fact known by all, that for years past
.he grossest inequalities have existed in the value fixed
upon all kinds of property by the county assessors; and
that the county boards of supervisors have failed to cor-
rect the evil. In some counties, it is said that asses-
sors secure their elections by pledges made to assess
"he property in the county or certain kinds of it, at a
low value.' '
It was to correct this obvious injustice that a state agency
was created. Applicable portions of the statute follow
"The Kentucky Tax Commission shall equalize each
year the assessments of the property among the counties.
it shall with such . information that it may
obtain from any source determine the ratio of the
assessed valuation of the property to the fair cash
value. The Kentucky Tax Commission shall have pow-
er to increase or decrease the aggregate assessed valua-
tion of the property of any county or taxing district
thereof or any class of property or any item in any
class of property. The Kentucky Tax Commission shall
fix the assessment of all property at its fair cash value.
When the property in any county or any class of
property in any county is not assessed at its fair cash,
value, such assessment shall be increased or decreased
to its fair cash value by fixing the percentage of in-
crease or decrease necessary to effect the equalization."'"
The statute appears to be so worded as to be mandatory
rather than merely directive. Cooley points out that when
statutory provisions are merely for guidance or to secure order.
they usually are not mandatory, unless accompanied by negative
words. But if the provisions are intended for the protection of
the citizen, and to prevent a sacrifice of his property, they are
not directory, but mandatory and must be followed, or the acts
done will be invalid.' Obviously, these provisions are intended
for the protection of the citizen and so can fairly be construed
as mandatory If the statute is indeed mandatory, and if the
Tax Commission actually fulfills the duty imposed by the statute.
the inevitable result will be an approximate uniformity of
assessment throughout the state, either at fair cash value or at
the same ratio to fair cash value. The taxpayer has a right to
expect that this result will be reached. It has been stated that
town and county Boards of Supervisors " are to the tax-
' Spalding v. Hill, 86 Ky. 656, 661, 7 S.W 27, 28 (1888).
'Ky. R. S. (1946) sec. 133.150.
" 2 COOLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) Chap. 10, sec. 510, pp
1136-1137.
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payers of the towns and counties what thins [State] Board is
to the different counties of the state, only the law has invested
them with greater powers." ", If, then, the commision has a
duty to act, the next question becomes whether the evidence
indicates that they actually have acted. An examination of
available statistics makes it clear that they have not.
The Bureau of Business Research at the University of
Kentucky shows in chart form the ratio of assessed value to
selling price of recently transferred parcels of realty in Ken-
tucky cities." It shows an assessment ratio ranging from 82.5%
for first class cities to 48.2% for fifth class cities. Figures com-
piled by the Department of Revenue for 1945 show the final
assessment ratio for lots, on a county-wide basis. Here, too, the
discrepancy is revealing, both as to 1945 figures, and those for
a five year average. The state ratio for 1945 is 48.0%, while
for individual counties, the ratio ranges from. Wayne county
with 25.0% and Magoffin county with 25.1% up to Martin
county with 98.2% and Wolfe county with 112.7%, Of the four
larger counties of Campbell, Fayette, Jefferson and Kenton.
Kenton is lowest with a figure of 38.5% and Jefferson highest
with 81.1%. The five year average for the state shows 59.6%,
while for the same period the counties show Perry at 42.1%,
Magoffin 42.3% and Wolfe 99.7%. Of the four larger counties
Fayette shows a five year average of 58.9% and Jefferson 84.2%.
The report of the Kentucky Department of Revenue"
reveals rather interesting figures which indicate the operational
efficiencv of the state equalization body Their figures show the
"Percentage Raises Ordered by the Kentucky Tax Commission
to Equalize Real Estate Assessments Made by the County Tax
Comnmissioners."" An exanunation of these figures for the year
1945 for town lots, the same basis used in the earlier analysis
herein, shows that Wayne county, which began with a ratio of
25.0% was raised 20%, while Miagoffin county, which originally
" Russell v. Carlisle & Litsey 10 Ky L. Rep. 25, 26, 8 S.W 14,
15 (1888).
"Ky. City Finances (1946) UNIV. OF KY. BUREAU OF BUSINESS
RESEARCH BULL. No. 12, Table 21, p. 127.
' APPENDIX TO 29TH ANNUAL REPORT, Ky. DEPT. OF REV. (1946-47)
APPENDIX TO 29TH ANNUAL REPORT, Ky. DEPT. OF REV. Table
VII, p. 20 (1946-47).
Law-5
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had a ratio of 25.1% was raised 15%. On the other hand,
Simpson county, which began with a ratio of 27.9%, Carlisle
county with 27.9%, and Daviess county with 28.6%, were not
raised at all. Wolfe county, which originally had a ratio of
112.7%, was raised by the Department an additional 10%.
It is interesting to note that during 1942, an election year,
no increases at all were made, the Department's report saying,
"As an experiment the Kentucky Tax Commission in 1942
agreed with the county tax commissioners not to make any
blanket raises for that assessment year." ' In 1943, 49 raises
were ordered, in 1944, 31 raises, in 1945, 24, and in 1946,
another election year, just 6 increases were ordered. There are
120 counties in the state.
These figures seem to indicate that the statutor- mandate
is not being complied with and that corrections, even when
made, fail to effect the intended equality of burden. It must
be remembered that a disproportionate amessment does not
necessarily involve an excessive assessment, since if one county
is assessed at 70% and another at 40%, the result is dispropor-
tionate. even though neither is excessive.
SUGGESTED METHOD OF SECURING RELIEF
There remains the question of whether any action can be
brought to compel the state body to act. The immediate objection
is likely to be that their actions are a matter of discretion, and
as such cannot be controlled. It is admitted that the writ of
mandamus is granted for the purpose of compelling action by
public officials, and not for the purpose of controlling their
judgment or discretion and that, therefore, when a tax official
or board has acted in good faith in assessing property for the
purpose of taxation, mandanmus normally will not lie to review
their decision or to compel them to make a new assessment."
However, it is.just as true that actions may be maintained to
eompel state officers or agencies to perform a duty imposed
upon them by law, or to refrain from doing smething that the
.APPENDIX To 29Mn ANNUAL REPORT, KY. DEPT. OF REV. p. 8.
Southern Pacific Co. v. Comm., 134 Ky. 410, 120 S.W 309(1909).
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law directs them not to do. " It is not contended that the court
should function as the equalization board, nor that they should
substitute their opinion of value for that of the assessing
officials, it is contended that the court, functioning as a court,
has the power and duty to compel the equalization board to
function as an equalization board, i. e., compel them to exercise
their judgment.
The writer of this note has been unable to discover any
cases in this state where the court has attempted to compel the
state equalization body to revise their equalization figures,
indeed the issue seems never to have been presented squarely
before-the court. Nonetheless, it is submitted that such action
is not only possible, but highly proper. The court has stated
that the board " is only limited by the purpose and spirit
of the law "" Clearly, the purpose and spirit of the law is
equality of burden for property owners throughout the state.
In Ry v Arnmstrong"' the court recognized the posAibility that
the state board might not fulfill their function, although in that
case no action was allowed. There a taxpayer, after the board
had increased the valuation in Jefferson county by 12%, sought
to enjoin the county court clerk from extending the raise on the
assessor's books, on th.e ground that the board failed to increase
many other counties where it was conceded that property was
assessed at less than value. In refusing the in.junction the court
held that the petition was too general and that "The allegations
may be true, and Jefferson county may have still been raised
only to its proper equalization rate." ' In C 4ty of Louisville v
Martin" the State Tax Commission made a blanket asessment
on whiskev of $18.00 per barrel for state, county, municipal and
district taxation. The court refused to mandatorily enjoin the
commission to reassess the whiskey in conformity with the
Constitutional and statutory requirement, on the grounds that
(1) There is a presumption of proper discharge of duty by the
, City of Louisville v. Martin, 284 Ky 490, 144 S.W 2d 1034
(1940) Board of Councilmen v State Highway Comm., 236 Ky. 253,
32 S.W 2d 1008 (1930)
Russell v. Carlisle & Litsey 10 Ky. L. Rep. 25, 27, 8 S.W 14,
15 (1888).
140 Ky 800, 131 S.W 1039 (1910).
°Ray v. Armstrong, 140 Ky. 800, 805, 131 S.W 1039, 1042 (1910).
'284 Ky. 490, 144 S.W 2d 1034 (1940).
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commission, (2) The commission is invested with broad discre-
tion, and mere errors of judgment will not authorize interfer-
ence, (3) Mandamus will be granted to compel action, but not
to control the judgment. It should be noted, however, that in
this case there was no evidence of non-equalization.
If we turn to decisions in other states it becomes readily
apparent that a writ of mandamus to compel proper equalization
is not outside the realm of possibilities. In an Arkansas case
arising in the Federal court12 the plaintiff had a judgment
against a county for the cost of erecting a new courthouse,
which judgment the county could not pay because of lack of
funds. The property in the county was assessed at 50% of true
value, as was other property in other counties in the state. The
court, after citing the Constitutional and statutory requirements
of "true market value," equality and uniformity, held that the
plaintiff might have a writ of mandamus to compel increase in
valuation in the county, even though this would make the
assessment in that county higher than the other counties of the
state. While the result in this case was to make the assessments
disproportionate, rather than to equalize them, it does indicate,
that the court may order the equalizing body to make changes.
In a recent Michigan case the court was emphatic in stating
that " equality of burden cannot exist without uniformity
in the mode of the assessment, as well as in the rate of taxation.
But this is not all. The uniformity must be co-extensave with
the territory to which it applies. If a State tax, it must be
uniform over all the State, if a county, town, or city tax, it
must be uniform throughout the extent of the territory to which
it is applicable."" And again "County equalization is made.
without regard to variations between boards of supervisors of
different counties in applying the rule of true cash value, and
does not necessarily result in uniformity of valuation as between
counties. The purpose of state equalization is to correct
improper application of the true cash value rule and resulting
variations in assessments, as between counties."
'U. S. ex rel. Falls City Construction Co. v. Jimmerson, 222 Fed.
489 (C.C.A. 8th, 1915) cert. dented, 239 U. S. 641.
' Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Authority" v. Boards of Sup'rs. of
Wayne, etc. Counties, 304 Mich. 328, - 8 N.W 2d 85, 88 (1943).
14Id. at- 8N.W 2d at 89.
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That a mandamus will lie is clearly proved by the action of
the Iowa court in a case almost squarely in point with the
problem here presented.' There the state commission had made
some original assessments and also acted as a board of equaliza-
tion. The plaintiff, an individual taxpayer, appeared before the
board and protested that the commission had made the original
assessments too low, and had failed to equalize among counties,
some counties being assessed at 100% of actual value, and others
at 50%. The commission adopted thie novel position that such
practice was authorized since it was a custom of long standing
(a position which some taxpayers in this state nmght well con-
sider our own board to have taken) When the commission
failed to heed the taxpayer's protests he sought action in the
courts, and was there more successful. In answer to the argument
that a taxpayer had no standing to question the action (or non-
action) of the board, the court states
"If the state has any interest in this case it is that
its officers perform their duties. The defendants are
violating a legislative command of the State to assess
and tax all property at its actual value. Their failure
to comply with this mandate imposes an unfair and
disproportionate share of the tax burden of the State
upon the plaintiff and those in like situation, and per-
mits others to escape their equitable share of that
burden."'
Commenting on the position of the board that they were
AlYmg what others before them had done, the court dismisses
that attempted justification by saying
they have no right to disregard this legislative
injunction, because they deem it unwise or inexpedient,
or because others in their position in the past have so
violated the law. Under the law and the facts they may
be compelled by mandamus not only to act, but to so
act as to bring about a certain result, that is, the valua-
tion of property at its actual value."' (italics added)
After considering other possible remedies, and deciding
that they are inadequate, and in answer to the frequently ad-
vanced contention that mandamus will not lie to compel a choice
of judgment, the court, citing Ruling Case Law, held that
' Pierce v. Green, 229 Iowa 22, 294 N.W 237 (1940).
Id. at - 294 N.W at 245.
" Id. at - 294 N.W at 248.
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"A public officer or inferior tribunal may be guilty
of so gross an abuse of discretion, or such an evasion of
positive duty, as to amount to a virtual refusal to per-
form the duty en3oined, or to act at all, in contempla-
tion of law; and in such a case a mandamus would
afford a remedy where there was no other adequate
remedy provided by law."s
Assuming the improbable, that the Kentucky board has no
knowledge of existing conditions, it would appear that a tax-
payer from one of the more heavily burdened counties ought
to lay the foundation for his appeal to the courts by making an
appearance before the board and protesting their methods. After
having done so, he will be in a position where he can seek the
assistance of the court.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it appears that the individual taxpayer and
property owner has fairly adequate machinery available to
correct al individual assessment. If he is alert to his possibilities
and statutory rights, he is likely to secure a fair assessment, by
appeal to the local board of supervisors. If the assessing officials
act outside their authority, he has a remedy available through
the courts.
The process of correction of assessments on a county-wide
level so as to equalize the burden among the different counties,
on the other hand, appears burdensome and inadequate. 'While
the machinery for correction theoretically exists, it requires but
little perspicuity to conclude that in operation the result is far
from equitable. It is not within the purview of this note to
outline a remedy, or even a partial cure. Certain it is that the
machinery as a whole is badly in need of an overhaul, in view
of the fact that many cities are already taxing at the constitu-
tional limitation and the state meets the cry for expanded
Id. at - 294 N.W at 249.
Ky. City Finances (1946) UNIV. OF KY. BUREAU OF BUSINESS
RESEARCH BULL. No. 12, at p. 130.
Some idea of the urgency of the problem faced by municipali-
ties can be gathered from two newspaper stories appearing on the
same day. The (Ky.) Courier-Journal, Feb. 12, 1948, sec. 2, p. 2,
col. 1, states that the Attorney General's office declared it would be
illegal for the city of Newport to tax "gaming interests" in order to
meet a pending financial crisis in that city. The Lexington (Ky.)
Leader, Feb. 12, 1948, p. 1, col. 5, reports that at a meeting of the
Tix AssSSMENT
services with the answer that revenues will not permit. Whether
-the -solution lies m actual full value assessment (theoretically
required now), closer supervision of local assessment (also
theoretically required now'Y), or a state agency to handle all
assessments, state, county, and local, is a problem for the legis-
lature and existing enforeement agencies. In the absence of
corrective measures undertaken in ns behalf, it is suggested
that the taxpayer might himself move to correct the condition,
or at least call attention to his plight, by action to compel the
existing agencies to act.
Kentucky chapter of Public Administrators, the Lexington Finance
Director stressed the need for a re-assessing in that city, pointing
out that the assessor "does the best he can, but it's not good enough."
At the same meeting the newspaper reports, the City Finance Direc-
tor of Louisville declared that property there "is notoriously under-
assessed," and that the entire problem is complicated by "too many
politicians-there's your difficulty-they get in our way"
"°Ky. R. S. (1946) secs. 131.140 (3), 132.420.
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